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CLEANING UP OUR TOXIC COASTS:
A PRECAUTIONARY AND HUMAN HEALTH-BASED APPROACH TO COASTAL
ADAPTATION
Robin Kundis Craig*
ABSTRACT
Hurricanes in the United States in 2005, 2012, and 2017 have all
revealed an insidious problem for coastal climate change adaptation: toxic
contamination in the coastal zone. As sea levels rise and violent coastal
storms become increasingly frequent, this legacy of toxic pollution
threatens immediate emergency response, longer term human health, and
coastal ecosystems’ capacity to adapt to changing coastal conditions.
Focusing on Hurricane Harvey’s 2017 devastation of Houston,
Texas, as its primary example, this Article first discusses the toxic legacy
still present in many coastal environments. It then examines the existing
laws available to clean up the coastal zone—CERCLA, RCRA, and the
Coastal Zone Management Act at the federal level, land use planning, and
state tort law—both to identify ways in which states and the federal
government could more effectively implement existing law and to suggest
improvements to these existing laws to more emphatically prioritize the
elimination of toxic coastal legacies. It concludes with three specific
recommendations that precautionarily prioritize human health
considerations in coastal management as a means of reducing coastal
toxicity in the Anthropocene.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Hurricane Harvey, a Category 4 hurricane, made landfall on the central
Texas coast just north of Corpus Christi on August 25, 2017,1 it demonstrated both the
power and the danger of coastal storms in ways that should be relevant for U.S. coastal
policy throughout the 21st century. First, Harvey was huge and repeatedly battered the
Gulf coast. At its first landfall, the hurricane was 280 miles in diameter and had 130 mileper-hour winds.2 It moved north to Houston the next day and remained there for four
days, then made landfall a third time on August 29 at Port Arthur and Beaumont, Texas,
near the Louisiana border.3 While Hurricane Harvey concentrated its force on Texas and
Louisiana, “[i]t affected 13 million people from Texas through Louisiana, Mississippi,
Tennessee, and Kentucky.”4 At least 88 people died as a result of the storm,5 and
thousands more were left homeless.6
Second, Hurricane Harvey brought record-breaking rainfall—and subsequent
unprecedented flooding—to the Gulf Coast.7 As noted, the hurricane stalled out over
Houston, dropping two feet of rain in the first 24 hours and 40 inches over 48 hours.8

1

Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13,
2018).
2
CNN News, “Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What happened and what’s next,”
https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/hurricane-harvey (as viewed Feb. 19, 2018); Kimberly
Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13,
2018).
3
Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13,
2018).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
For a more comprehensive discussion of Hurricane Harvey’s flooding and its potential
implications for reauthorization of the National Flood Insurance Program, see Robin
Kundis Craig, Harvey, Irma, and the NFIP: Did the 2017 Hurricane Season Matter to
Flood Insurance Reauthorization?, 40:3 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. XXX, XXX
(forthcoming 2018).
8
Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13,
2018). “In comparison Hurricane Katrina dropped just 5 to 10 inches of rain in 48 hours.
Most of its flooding came from storm surges that overwhelmed the levee system.” Id.
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Two reservoirs overflowed.9 When the hurricane made landfall for the third time, “[i]t
dumped 26 inches of rain in 24 hours” at the Louisiana border,10 then rained an additional
10 inches on Nashville, Tennessee, on September 1.11 In an attempt to describe the scale
of the rainfall, a Washington Post reporter noted that “[a]t least 20 inches of rain fell over
an area (nearly 29,000 square miles) larger than 10 states, including West Virginia and
Maryland (by a factor of more than two)” and “[a]t least 30 inches of rain fell over an
area (more than 11,000 square miles) equivalent to Maryland’s size.”12 At the storm’s
peak on September 1, one-third of Houston was underwater,13 and “[t]otal rainfall hit
51.88 inches in Cedar Bayou on the outskirts of Houston. That’s a record for a single
storm in the continental United States.”14
Third, Harvey may be the first hurricane for which scientists agree that climate
change made a significant contribution the storm’s severity.15 While scientists still will
not assert that climate change “causes” any particular coastal storm, in December 2017,
9

Id.
Id.; CNN News, “Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What happened and what’s next,”
https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/hurricane-harvey (as viewed Feb. 19, 2018).
11
Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13,
2018).
12
Jason Samenow, “Harvey is a 1000-year flood event unprecedented in scale,” The
Washington
Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weathergang/wp/2017/08/31/harvey-is-a-1000-year-flood-event-unprecedented-inscale/?utm_term=.a36393ce6b2f (Aug. 13, 2017).
13
Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13,
2018).
14
Id.; CNN News, “Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What happened and what’s next,”
https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/hurricane-harvey (as viewed Feb. 19, 2018).
15
Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13,
2018); Henry Fountain, “Scientists Link Hurricane Harvey’s Record Rainfall to Climate
Change,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/climate/hurricaneharvey-climate-change.html?_r=0 (Dec. 13, 2017); Mark D. Risser & Michael F.
Wehner, Attributable Human-Induced Changes in the Likelihood and Magnitude of the
Observed Extreme Precipitation during Hurricane Harvey, 44:24 GEOPHYSICAL
RESEARCH LETTERS 12,457, 12,457-64 (23 Dec. 2017); Geert Jan van Oldenborgh, Karin
van der Wiel, Antonia Sebastian, Roop Singh, Julie Arrighi, Friederike Otto, Karsten
Haustein, Sihan Li, Gabriel Vecchi, & Heidi Cullen, Attribution of extreme rainfall from
Hurricane Harvey, August 2017, 12:12 ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LETTERS 124009,
https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa9ef2 (13 Dec. 2017).
10
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two research groups concluded that Harvey’s record rainfall “was as much as 38 percent
higher than would be expected in a world that was not warming.”16 Warmer-than-normal
air and ocean water temperatures, sea levels that are six inches higher than 20 years ago,
and climate change-affected weather patterns that promote storm stalling may all have
contributed to Harvey’s record-breaking precipitation.17 In addition, both studies “found
that climate change roughly tripled the odds of a Harvey-type storm.”18 Thus, as climate
scientists have long predicted,19 it appears that climate change is already increasing the
likelihood of increasingly severe hurricanes.
Finally, and of particular relevance to this Article, Hurricane Harvey
demonstrated in immediately comprehensible ways the latent toxicity of the United
States’ coasts. For example, among other issues, “Harvey flooded 800 wastewater
treatment facilities and 13 Superfund sites[,] spread[ing] sewage and toxic chemicals into
the flooded areas.”20 As will be discussed in more detail in Part II, Harvey, and to a lesser
extent Hurricane Irma, caused significant toxic pollutant loading in the communities they
affected, particularly Houston. Given the prediction of increasing numbers of
increasingly severe coastal storms throughout the 21st century,21 Harvey and Irma make
compelling cases for a more precautionary and health-based approach to coastal
management that prioritizes: (1) cleaning up current coastal contamination; (2)
16

Henry Fountain, “Scientists Link Hurricane Harvey’s Record Rainfall to Climate
Change,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/climate/hurricaneharvey-climate-change.html?_r=0 (Dec. 13, 2017); Michael Greshko, “Climate Change
Likely
Supercharged
Hurricane
Harvey,”
National
Geographic,
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/climate-change-study-hurricane-harveyflood/ (Dec. 13, 2017) (reporting the same 38 percent high). See also Risser & Wehner,
supra note 15, at 12,462-63 (reporting 19 percent as most probable); Oldenborgh et al.,
supra note 15, at 1 (reporting 15 percent as most probable).
17
Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13,
2018); German Lopez, “How global warming likely made Harvey much worse, explained
by
a
climatologist,”
Vox,
https://www.vox.com/science-andhealth/2017/8/28/16214268/houston-floods-harvey-global-warming (Aug. 28, 2017).
18
Michael Greshko, “Climate Change Likely Supercharged Hurricane Harvey,” National
Geographic,
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/climate-change-studyhurricane-harvey-flood/ (Dec. 13, 2017); Oldenborgh et al., supra note 15, at 1.
19
E.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS Report 53 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT].
20
Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13,
2018).
21
2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 19, at 53.
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retrofitting existing coastal facilities that handle hazardous and toxic materials to prevent
further coastal contamination; and (3) limiting the siting of addition such facilities in the
coastal zone in the future.
This Article explores the toxic risks along the United States’ coasts, particularly
in light of the increasing threat from coastal storms. It begins in Part II by providing an
overview of existing contamination in the United States coastal zones, focusing on the
damage that Hurricane Harvey caused in its interactions with Houston’s many hazardous
waste sites and toxics-handling facilities. Part III then reviews existing legal authorities
for dealing with coastal toxicity in both federal and state environmental and tort law. Part
IV offers suggestions for a more precautionary and health-based approach to coastal
toxicity, emphasizing both cleanup of existing problems and more toxicity-sensitive
engagement in coastal land use planning and building codes. The Article concludes that
there is much that federal, coastal state, and local governments could do to reduce toxicity
exposure along the coasts during coastal storms, emphasizing that these measures also
make considerable sense as a climate change adaptation strategy.
II. THE UNITED STATES’ TOXIC COASTS
A.

An Overview of Coastal Toxicity in the United States

The United States is a coastal nation. As of 2010, over half of the U.S. population
(excluding Alaska) lived in one of the nation’s 673 coastal counties.22 “Between 1960
and 2008, the national coastline population rose by 84 percent, compared with 64 percent
inland, according to the Census Bureau.”23 Moreover, coastal U.S. populations continue
to grow at a faster pace than inland populations, despite significant hurricane seasons in
2005 (Katrina), 2012 (Sandy), and 2017 (Harvey, Irma, and Maria).24 Thus, any risks to
coastal populations pose a significant national problem.
22

National Ocean Service, NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Coastal Hazards:
Preparing
for
the
Threats
that
Face
Our
Coastal
Communities,
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/hazards/natural-hazards/ (as viewed July 30, 2018). See
also Sarah G. McCarthy, John P. Incardona, & Nathaniel L. Scholtz, Coastal Storms,
Toxic Runoff, and the Sustainable Conservation of Fish and Fisheries, 64 AMERICAN
FISHERIES
SOCIETY
SYMPOSIUM
2
(Jan.
2008),
available
at
https://www.coralreef.gov/transportation/stormsfish.pdf (noting that this land area
represents only 17 percent of the United States).
23
Jeff Donn, “U.S. coastal population continues to grow despite lessons of past storms,”
The Denver Post, https://www.denverpost.com/2017/09/16/us-coastal-populationgrowth/ (Sept. 16, 2017).
24
Id.
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The nation’s coasts receive toxic and hazardous pollution and exposure from a
number of sources. For example, upstream agricultural and urban runoff carries
pesticides, petroleum hydrocarbons, heavy metals, pathogens, and pharmaceuticals
downstream to coastal communities and ecosystems;25 mercury has shown up in
California coastal fog banks.26 In addition, between 1918 and 1970, the Department of
Defense disposed of chemical weapons in the ocean, including sulphur mustard and
chemical nerve agents, along all three U.S. coasts,27 although the Department concluded
in a 2016 report to Congress that these wastes do not pose a significant threat to human
health or the environment and that removal is not warranted.28 Facilities emitting air
pollutants, including power plants and waste incinerators, can also be sources of coastal
toxic exposure.29
The far more worrisome sources of coastal toxics with respect to hurricanes and
sea-level rise, however, are land-based contaminated sites—landfills, illegal hazardous
waste disposal sites, and legacy toxic waste dumps—and ongoing facilities that handle
toxic and hazardous substances. At the federal level, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) tracks hazardous disposal sites through the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, often referred to
as Superfund).30 Just a glance at the EPA’s map31 of sites listed on the National Priorities
25

Id. at 2.
Alison Hawkes, “Toxic Fog? Mercury Showing Up in Coastal California Fog Banks,”
KQED Science, https://www.kqed.org/science/419936/toxic-fog-mercury-showing-upin-coastal-california-fog-banks (Dec. 18, 2015).
27
David M. Bearden, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Disposal of Chemical
Weapons in the Ocean: Background and Issues for Congress 2 (as updated Jan. 3, 2007),
available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33432.pdf.
28
U.S. Dept. of Defense, Research Related to Effect of Ocean Disposal of Munitions in
U.S. Coastal Waters: A Report to Congress 2 (Nov. 2016), available at
https://www.denix.osd.mil/derp/home/documents/sea-disposal-report-to-congress/.
29
See, e.g., Toxics Action Center, Toxics in Massachusetts: A Town-by-Town Profile 1216 (April 2010), available at https://toxicsaction.org/wp-content/uploads/TAC-toxics-inmassachusetts.pdf (discussing air pollution as a toxicity problem in Massachusetts and
providing maps of power plants and waste incineration facilities that show where these
sources are located along the coast).
30
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012).
31
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Superfund National Priorities List Map,
https://epa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=33cebcdfdd1b4c3a8b51
d416956c41f1 (as viewed July 30, 2018). See also U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
Cleanups
in
My
Community
Map,
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/apex/cimc/f?p=cimc:map:0:::71:P71_WELSEARCH:NULL%7
26
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List (NPL)32 indicates that many coastal cities contain significant concentrations of these
highly toxic Superfund sites, especially Seattle, Washington; San Francisco, California;
Los Angeles, California; Houston, Texas; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Pensacola, Florida;
Tampa/St. Petersburg, Florida; Jacksonville, Florida; Wilmington, North Carolina; and
essentially the entire Atlantic coast from Norfolk, Virginia, north to Portland, Maine.
The EPA regulates ongoing industrial facilities that could pose hazardous or toxic
waste problems through the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).33
Releases at hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities require
corrective actions—that is, cleanups.34 While the EPA does not keep cleanup statistics in
terms of inland versus coastal communities, its “Cleanups in My Community” map35
indicates that RCRA corrective action sites are approximately as prevalent as NPL sites,
roughly doubling the federally-actionable contaminated toxic sites along the U.S. coasts.
State-specific information can also help to flesh out the potential toxicity of the
nation’s coasts. In Massachusetts, for example, RCRA large-quantity hazardous waste
generators, CERCLA NPL sites, and state-designated Tier 1 hazardous waste sites are
concentrated along the coast.36 Together with landfills, power plants, and incinerators,
these sites produce a rather pronounced toxic load on the coast, especially around
Boston.37 As the Toxics Action Center has summarized,
Massachusetts has thousands of potential and identified hazardous waste
sites awaiting cleanup, some of the worst air quality in the nation, and rivers
and lakes polluted by industrial contaminants and toxic mercury. Asthma
and cancer rates are some of the highest in the country, and both can be
linked to environmental causes. Massachusetts is also plagued by economic

CCleanup%7C%7C%7C%7Cfalse%7Ctrue%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7C
%7C%7Csites%7CY (as viewed July 30, 2018).
32
Id. § 9605(a); U.S. Envtl Protection Agency, Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL),
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-national-priorities-list-npl (as viewed July 30,
2018).
33
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-69992k (2012).
34
Id. at 6924(u), (v).
35
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Cleanups in My Community Map,
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/apex/cimc/f?p=cimc:map:0:::71:P71_WELSEARCH:NULL%7
CCleanup%7C%7C%7C%7Cfalse%7Ctrue%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7C
%7C%7Csites%7CY (as viewed July 30, 2018).
36
See Toxics Action Center, supra note 29, at 11, 19, 21 (providing maps).
37
See id. at 26 (showing the cumulative concentration of toxic facilities).
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disparities. Poor urban areas are often the most overburdened by toxic
pollution.38
Although characterization of the toxic burden and risks facing citizens living on
the United States’ coasts remains incomplete, scientists and federal and state agencies
have compiled enough data to suggest that coastal residents should be concerned. For
example, between 1991 and 1997, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) analyzed 1543 surface sediment samples from 25 estuaries and marine bays—
i.e., the sediments closest to shore—from all three U.S. Coasts (Gulf, Atlantic, and
Pacific), concluding that about 6 percent of the coast was toxic; the EPA’s parallel study
calculated that 7 percent of the coast was toxic.39 However, tests based on sub-lethal
effects on marine organisms suggested a much broader problem, with 26 to 39 percent of
the U.S. coasts returning toxic results.40
Another indicator for concern comes from the EPA’s semi-regular National
Coastal Condition Reports, which contain summaries of fish tissue contamination by
region that provide another indicator of coastal toxic exposure. Specifically, the fish
tissue assessment looks at the concentration of various toxics—arsenic, cadmium,
mercury, selenium, chlordane, DDT, dieldrin, endosulfan, endrin, heptachlor epoxide,
hexachlorobenzene, lindane, mirex, toxaphene, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs), and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)—in fish and assesses coastal condition
based on risks to human health through fish consumption.41 In the latest National Coastal
Condition Report from 2012, 13 percent of U.S. coasts overall were in poor condition for
fish tissue contamination, but regions ranged from zero percent in poor condition
(southeastern Alaska and American Samoa) to 20 percent in poor condition along the
northeast coast (although, notably, the calculations did not include the area of the Gulf
of Mexico’s dead zone).42 Another 13 percent of U.S. coasts overall were in fair
condition,43 indicating that, in total, over one-quarter of the nation’s coasts face some
risk from toxicity. The EPA further noted that areas “in poor and fair condition were

38

Id. at 4.
Edward R. Long, “Spatial Extent of Sediment Toxicity in U.S. Estuaries and Marine
Bays,” in SHABEG S. SANDHU, BRIAN D. MELZIAN, EDWARD R. LONG, WALTER G.
WHITFORD, & BARBARA T. WALTON, EDS., MONITORING ECOLOGICAL CONDITION IN THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES 391, 391 (Kluwer Academic 2000).
40
Id.
41
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL COASTAL CONDITION REPORT IV, at 25
(April
2012),
available
at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201410/documents/0_nccr_4_report_508_bookmarks.pdf.
42
Id. at ES-8, tbl. ES-2.
43
Id. at 49.
39
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dominated by samples with elevated concentrations of total PCBs, total DDT, total
PAHs, and mercury.”44
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has compiled data from the EPA’s
Superfund database for CERCLA and Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database for the
federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA),45 as well as
several other sources of information from both the federal government and Canada,46 to
create TOXMAP,47 a map of releases of specific toxic chemicals across the United States.
Designed originally to facilitate emergency response,48 EPCRA requires all U.S.
facilities releasing listed toxic and hazardous substances at or above reportable thresholds
to report those releases,49 which are compiled onto the TRI database.50 TOXMAP makes
clear that larger cities, whether coastal or not, generally endure the greatest
concentrations of toxic releases. Nevertheless, as in the EPA’s “Cleanups in My
Community” map, many coastal areas light up particularly noticeably on the NIH’s
map—Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles on the Pacific; Houston, New Orleans,
and Tampa on the Gulf; Milwaukee, Chicago, and Detroit along the Great Lakes; and
almost all of Florida’s and the northeastern states’ Atlantic coasts.
Such compilations and characterizations of “standard” toxicity, however, do not
paint the full picture of coastal toxic risk. Coastal storms and hurricanes can dramatically
increase coastal communities’ acute and even longer-term toxic exposure. Moreover,
toxic sites and infrastructure along the coast pose long-term concerns in the face of global
sea-level rise. Hurricane Harvey provided a particularly graphic example of how storms
can interact with coastal toxicity to pose significant human health concerns.
B.

Hurricane Harvey and Houston, August-September 2017

Hurricanes in the United States dramatically illuminate the latent toxicity of
coastal zone infrastructure and reveal the fact that invading seawater threatens both
unusually high emissions of hazardous air pollutants and a toxic soup of sewage, oil, and
hazardous chemicals from coastal businesses (such as dry cleaners and auto repair
44

Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2012).
46
National Institutes of Health, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, TOXMAP Fact
Sheet, https://toxmap.nlm.nih.gov/toxmap/help/toxmapfs.html (as viewed July 31, 2018).
47
National Institutes of Health, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, TOXMAP Home
Page, https://toxmap.nlm.nih.gov/toxmap/app/ (as viewed July 31, 2018).
48
42 U.S.C. §§ 11003-11005 (2012).
49
Id. §§ 11002, 10023.
50
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Toxic Release Inventory Program,
https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program (as viewed July 31, 2018).
45

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224768

10

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

Aug. 1, 2018

facilities), industrial sites, Superfund sites, and toxic waste facilities.51 While the full
threat of dissolved and mixing toxic chemicals has not yet been fully realized as a result
of a major U.S. coastal storm, some have come alarmingly close. For example, after
Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005, “hazardous substances such as
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), lead, and arsenic were detected in the air, soil, and
sediment samples,” and “the potential for a toxic release of hazardous substances after a
storm exists.”52 Similarly, after Hurricane Sandy hit New York and New Jersey in 2012,
officials “had to monitor 247 Superfund sites—one of which, the Gowanus Canal,
overflowed into people’s homes.”53
1.

Waste-Related Spills During Hurricane Harvey

Hurricane Harvey’s 2017 flooding of the Houston area—the United States’
fourth-largest city—may produce one of the most toxic legacies of U.S. hurricanes. To
begin, Harvey inundated 13 of the Houston area’s 41 hazardous waste sites,54 and the
51

Danny D. Reible et al., Toxic and Contaminant Concerns Generated by Hurricane
Katrina,
36:1
THE
BRIDGE,
Spring
2006,
http://www.nae.edu/NAE/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/MKEZ-6MYQQP?OpenDocument;
Kathryn Lane, Kizzy Charles-Guzman, KatherineWheeler, Zaynah Abid, Nathan Graber,
& Thomas Matte, Health Effects of Coastal Storms and Flooding in Urban Areas: A
Review and Vulnerability Assessment, 2013 J. ENVTL. & PUBLIC HEALTH, Article ID
913064, at 2 (21 April 2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/913064.
52
Lane et al., supra note 51, at 5. See also Steven M. Presley, Thomas R. Rainwater,
Galen P. Austin, Steven G. Platt, John C. Zak, George P. Cobb, Eric J. Marsland, Kang
Tian, Baohong Zhang, Todd A. Anderson, Stephen B. Cox, Michael T. Abel, Blair D.
Leftwich, Jennifer R. Huddleston, Randall M. Jeter, & Ronald J. Kendall, Assessment of
Pathogens and Toxicants in New Orleans LA Following Hurricane Katrina, 40:2 ENVTL.
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 468, 468 (Dec. 14, 2005) (“Concentrations of aldrin, arsenic,
lead, and seven semivolatile organic compounds in sediments/soils exceeded one or more
United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) thresholds for human health
soil screening levels and high priority bright line screening levels.”).
53
Emily Atkin, America Has a Toxic Waste Hurricane Problem, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
https://newrepublic.com/article/144737/america-toxic-waste-hurricane-problem (Sept.
12, 2017). See also Elizabeth A. Harris, “In Brooklyn, Worrying About Not Only
Flooding
but
What’s
In
the
Water,”
The
New
York
Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/nyregion/gowanus-canal-flooding-bringscontamination-concerns.html?mcubz=1 (Nov. 5, 2012) (reporting on the Gowanus Canal
Superfund site overflow).
54
Emily Atkin, America Has a Toxic Waste Hurricane Problem, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
https://newrepublic.com/article/144737/america-toxic-waste-hurricane-problem (Sept.
12, 2017). The New York Times reported that 14 sites had been flooded. Julie Turkewitz,
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city contains “several other highly toxic sites managed by the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality.”55 (Notably, Hurricane Irma a few weeks later was even worse
in terms of threatened superfund sites: 80 such sites stood in Hurricane Irma’s path
through Florida.56) The New York Times described Harvey’s floodwaters as “a stew of
toxic chemicals, sewage, debris and waste . . . . Runoff from the city’s sprawling
petroleum and chemicals complex contains any number of hazardous compounds. Lead,
arsenic and other toxic and carcinogenic elements may be leaching from some two dozen
Superfund sites in the Houston area.”57
The worst of the inundated waste sites was the San Jacinto Waste Pits, a “dioxinladen federal Superfund site whose protective cap was damaged by the raging San Jacinto
River.”58 “The San Jacinto Waste Pits are a heavily contaminated area near Houston that
is right next to homes and schools, and that has frightened residents for decades.”59 The
site consists of two waste pits in the middle of the San Jacinto river, where a paper mill
dumped its wastes—especially dioxin and furans—during the 1960s.60 Paper companies
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56
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12, 2017).
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Times,
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used dioxin to bleach paper white, and the compound is toxic at parts per quadrillion.61
Temporary concrete caps installed in 2011 were supposed to keep the pits from further
contaminating the river, but Hurricane Harvey caused the river to rip through them,62
releasing contamination to the river.
However, smaller waste spills were also noteworthy. For example, W&P
Development Corp., owns “an industrial park where about 100,000 gallons of oily
wastewater were reported to have spilled into the San Jacinto from Aug. 29 to Aug. 31.
The site was formerly Champion Paper Mill and a landfill there received wastes including
turpentine- and lead-contaminated soil and mercury until 2008.”63
Wastewaters also proved problematic. “The largest spill, by far, was at
ExxonMobil Corp.’s Olefins Plant in Baytown, east of the ship channel. Two days after
Harvey hit, some 457 million gallons of stormwater mixed with untreated wastewater,
including oil and grease, surged into an adjacent creek.”64 Floodwaters also became
contaminated with sewage, and testing of floodwater samples revealed E. coli bacterial
concentrations 10 to 80 times higher than the EPA’s recommendations for recreational
water quality (the recommendation for drinking water is zero), although all the tests for
heavy metals revealed concentrations below the EPA’s levels of concern.65
2.

Petroleum-Related Spills in Houston During Hurricane Harvey

However, Houston has more sources of toxicity than just waste sites. “Some 500
chemical plants, 10 refineries and more than 6,670 miles of intertwined oil, gas and
chemical pipelines line the nation's largest energy corridor.”66 The city is, of course,
61
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(Sept. 15, 2017).
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famous for its oil industry, including oil refineries. Needless to say, record flooding and
oil refineries don’t mix well. For example, “storage tanks holding crude oil, gasoline and
toxic contaminants failed when storm water from Harvey caused them to collapse,
spilling at least 145,000 gallons of fuel and polluting the air.” “High levels of the
carcinogen benzene were detected in a Houston neighborhood close to a Valero Energy
refinery, . . . heightening concerns over potentially hazardous leaks from oil and gas
industry sites damaged by Hurricane Harvey.” “Preliminary air sampling in the
Manchester district of Houston showed concentrations of up to 324 parts per billion of
benzene”—a concentration “above the level at which federal safety officials recommend
special breathing equipment for workers.” In late August, ExxonMobil acknowledged
“that Hurricane Harvey damaged two of its refineries, causing the release of hazardous
pollutants”—specifically, high emissions of volatile organic compounds and over 1
million pounds of sulfur dioxide,67 both of which are regulated air pollutants under the
Clean Air Act. Initial reports from Texas regulators indicate that because of Hurricane
Harvey, “the region’s massive petrochemical industry released more than 2 million
pounds of harmful pollutants into the air as of Aug. 29”—“‘roughly 40 percent of what
the entire Houston released in 2016 . . . .’”68 As of October 2017, the EPA was still
assessing three reported spills at US Oil Recovery, described by news outlets as “a former
petroleum industry waste processing plant contaminated with a dangerous brew of
cancer-causing chemicals.”69
Numerous other petroleum-related spills also occurred. Flooding in Panther
Creek, for example, caused several releases, including a “460,000-gallon gasoline spill
at a Magellan Midstream Partners tank farm and nearly 52,000 pounds of crude oil from
a Seaway Crude Pipeline Inc. tank.”70 Residents of Galena Park, a mostly Latino
67
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69
Michael Biesecker & Frank Bajak, “Hurricane Harvey: Floodwaters ‘caused chemical
spill’
at
Houston’s
dirtiest
toxic
waste
plant,”
The
Independent,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/hurricane-harvey-latest-houstonchemical-plant-toxic-spill-floodwater-us-oil-recovery-superfund-epa-a7954586.html (19
Sept. 2017).
70
CBS News, “Hurricane Harvey’s toxic impact deeper than public told,”
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hurricane-harveys-toxic-impact-deeper-than-publictold/ (March 22, 2018).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224768

14

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

Aug. 1, 2018

neighborhood, were subjected to more than one dozen releases within a two-mile radius
as a result of Harvey, including a gasoline spill at the Magellan terminal initially reported
at 42,000 gallons but eventually revealed to be ten times bigger.71 In addition, “[t]he spill
ranked as Texas’ largest reported Harvey-related venting of air pollutants, at 1,143
tons.”72
3.

Chemical Spills in Houston During Hurricane Harvey

As noted, Houston is also home to, or near, 500 chemical plants, many of which
were flooded. As CBS News reported in March 2018, “Nearly half a billion gallons of
industrial wastewater mixed with storm water surged out of just one chemical plant in
Baytown, east of Houston on the upper shores of Galveston Bay. Benzene, vinyl chloride,
butadiene and other known human carcinogens were among the dozens of tons of
industrial toxins released into surrounding neighborhoods and waterways following
Harvey's torrential rains.”73
Some of the chemical releases created acutely dangerous conditions. For
example, on August 28, “an 18-inch pipeline leak at Williams Midstream Services Inc.
unleashed a plume of [hydrogen chloride gas] near the intersection of two major
highways in La Porte, southeast of Houston, where the San Jacinto River meets the 50mile ship channel. It’s the petrochemical corridor's main artery that empties into
Galveston Bay.”74 The resulting toxic cloud of hydrochloric acid spread about onequarter mile through the industrial neighborhood, forcing people to remain inside lest the
vaporized acid burn their skin and lungs or suffocate and kill them.75 At the Channel
Biorefinery & Terminals, “some 80,000 gallons of methanol spilled from a tank rupture
into Greens Bayou, which enters the ship channel just downstream of the Magellan
terminal. Highly flammable and explosive, methanol can cause brain lesions and other
disorders.”76
Many other notable chemical releases occurred in and around Houston during
Harvey. Royal Dutch Shell PLC’s Deer Park complex on the ship channel’s south bank
released more than 3000 pounds of benzene, and the company initially reported a 1000-

71
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pound release of phenol, “which can burn skin and be potentially fatal . . . .”77 The
Chevron Phillips Chemical Company plant in Baytown released “about 34,000 pounds
of sodium hydroxide, or lye, which can cause severe chemical burns, and unpermitted
airborne emissions, including 28,000 pounds of benzene . . . .”78
One of the worst hit chemical plants during Hurricane Harvey was the Arkema
chemical plant, about 20 miles northeast of Houston,79 which is considered one of the
most hazardous plants in Texas.80 Harvey’s rains inundated the plant, causing it to lose
power, which in turn led to a loss of refrigeration.81 Unfortunately, “The plant
manufactures organic peroxides commonly used in everyday products like kitchen
countertops, industrial paints, polystyrene cups and plates, and PVC piping. The
materials must be kept very cool, otherwise there is ‘the potential for a chemical reaction
leading to a fire and/or explosion within the site confines,’ Arkema said.”82 Arkema itself
reported the sequence of events as follows:
The plant made extensive preparations prior to Hurricane Harvey. We have
backup generators at the site solely for the purpose of being a redundant
power supply for refrigeration necessary for the safe storage of products.
We also brought in diesel powered refrigerated tank trailers and additional
fuel as a further redundancy. Employees safely shut down all operations on
Friday, August 25, prior to the hurricane’s landfall. We left a small “rideout” crew on site to address situations that could arise at the site during the
storm to protect the safety and security of the community. The site lost
primary power early Sunday morning August 27. The additional back-up
generators subsequently were inundated by water and failed. On Monday,
August 28 temperature sensitive products were transferred into 8 diesel77
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powered refrigerated containers where they currently reside. We evacuated
the ride-out crew on Tuesday, August 29 for their safety. As of August 30,
most of the refrigeration units have failed due to flooding. The site itself is
now completely flooded and inaccessible except by boat. In conjunction
with the Department of Homeland Security and the State of Texas, Arkema
has set up a command post in an off-site location near the plant.83
“With the power out and cooling systems failing, volatile organic peroxides exploded
multiple times over the course of a week, producing towering pillars of fire and thick
plumes of black smoke.”84 In all, “[m]ore than 200 residents had to evacuate because of
the chemical fumes and noxious smoke caused by [the fire], and 21 people sought
medical attention.”85 In particular, “15 public safety officers were treated at a hospital
after inhaling smoke from chemical fires that followed the explosions.”86 These
“sickened first responders” later filed suit, “as have Harris and Liberty counties, which
claim the company violated numerous environmental and safety regulations.”87
4.

Houston’s Post-Harvey Toxic Exposure

Houston residents were aware of at least some of the toxic releases around them
during Harvey itself: “From Aug. 24 to Sept. 3, callers made 96 reports of oil, chemical
or sewage spills across southeast Texas.”88 As of March 2018, however, “reporters
83
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catalogued more than 100 Harvey-related toxic releases — on land, in water and in the
air. Most were never publicized, and in the case of two of the biggest ones, the extent or
potential toxicity of the releases was initially understated.”89 Notably, many of the
companies who owned the sites where spills occurred had violated environmental laws
in their management of those sites in the past.90
Perhaps most novel were the air pollution problems that Harvey generated: “from
Aug. 23 to Aug. 30, 46 facilities in 13 counties reported an estimated 4.6 million pounds
of airborne emissions that exceeded state limits, an analysis by the Environmental
Defense Fund, Air Alliance Houston and Public Citizen shows.”91 Air pollution issues
continued after the storm as plants that had shut down for the storm released unusual
amounts of pollutants in restarting. For example, “A giant plastics plant in Point Comfort,
about 100 miles southwest of Houston, released about 1.3 million pounds of excess
emissions, including toxic gases like benzene, when it restarted after the storm.”92
Clearly, acute toxic exposures occurred during and immediately after the
hurricane. For example, in early September, Houston “a high benzene level of 324 parts
per billion—more than three times the level at which federal worker safety guidelines
recommend special breathing equipment.”93 Around the San Jacinto Waste Pits,
“[p]reliminary data from the EPA indicated that in sediment samples taken around the
site, dioxins levels spiked 2,300 times above acceptable levels.”94
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However, because investigations remain incomplete, the longer-term toxic legacy
that Harvey gifted to Houston residents is less clear. “Texas regulators say they have
investigated 89 incidents, but have yet to announce any enforcement actions.”95
Nevertheless, government monitoring of residual toxicity in Houston has been limited
compared to what occurred after previous hurricanes, such as Ike (2008) and Katrina
(2005).96 Academic testing and studies, however, suggest that the storm essentially
washed out the city’s topsoil, leaving relatively few sites with worrisome levels of
petroleum-related toxins.97 Nevertheless, while residents were initially told that the
releases posed no threat to human health, as of March 2018 the EPA continued to worry
about local toxic “hotspots” and the risks that they pose.98
C.

The Long-Term Threat of Toxic Sea-Level Rise

While hurricanes likely Harvey dramatize coastal toxicity and its public health
risks for coastal inhabitants, sea-level rise (and the increased storm surge that comes with
it) present coastal planners with a far more insidious toxicity problem.
First, rising seas make coastal storm events worse; indeed, the exacerbation of
storm surge is the most immediate and significant consequence of sea-level rise.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “it is likely that
extreme sea levels (for example, as experienced in storm surges) have increased since
1970, being mainly the result of mean sea level rise.”99
Second, in many parts of the United States—notably the Gulf Coast—sea-level
rise will cause the ocean to progressively inundate and saturate existing toxic
infrastructure, potentially condemning emerging coastal communities and ecosystems to
a toxic existence. According to the IPCC, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 meters over
the period 1901 to 2010, and “the rate of sea level rise since the mid-19th century has
been larger than the mean rate during the previous two millennia.”100 The IPCC also
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concluded that the mean rate of global average sea level rise for the period from 1993 to
2010 was twice what occurred from 1901 to 2010.101
Sea level rise has two main components: melting land-based ice (glaciers and ice
shelves) and expanding volume as the ocean warms.102 Although the two contributors
have been roughly equal until recently, melting ice and disintegrating ice shelves have
become significantly more important.103 Sea level rise will continue to accelerate through
the 21st century and beyond, affecting a projected 95 percent of the ocean area and
approximately 70 percent of coastlines worldwide.104 However, sea level rise will not be
uniform across regions. For example, “[s]ince 1993, the regional rates for the Western
Pacific are up to three times larger than the global mean, while those for much of the
Eastern Pacific are near zero or negative.”105
The future of the planet’s ice presents a worrisome uncertainty, and the increasing
pace of polar ice melt has added significant volatility to the art of sea level rise
prediction.106 Studies repeatedly indicate that the Greenland ice sheet and Antarctic ice
are melting faster than expected,107 and the IPCC noted in 2014 that the Greenland and
Antarctic ice sheets were losing mass, likely at an increasing rate, and that glaciers around
the world have continued to shrink.108 It projects that these ice sheets and glaciers will
continue to decrease throughout the 21st century, shrinking 15% to 85% by 2100.109 The
IPCC concluded that knowledge concerning “[a]brupt and irreversible ice loss from the
Antarctic ice sheet…is insufficient to make a quantitative assessment” of its
101
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likelihood.110 However, the West Antarctic Ice Sheet contains enough ice to raise sea
level by five to seven meters (17-23 feet).111 If all of Antarctica melts, sea level will rise
approximately 60 meters, or almost 200 feet.112 If both Greenland and Antarctica melt
completely, sea level would rise about 65 meters,113 or approximately 215 feet.
Regardless of which of these ice-melt calamities occur, and when, sea-level rise
will continue throughout the 21st century,114 although its exact impact will vary
considerably among coastal regions. For example, the U.S. Global Change Research
Program has noted that the southeastern region of the United States, which includes the
Gulf Coast, is particularly at risk from sea-level rise, while the Northeast’s threats arise
more from coastal flooding as a result of increased precipitation and coastal storms.115 In
the Southeast,
Global sea level rose about eight inches in the last century and is projected
to rise another 1 to 4 feet in this century. Large numbers of southeastern
cities, roads, railways, ports, airports, oil and gas facilities, and water
supplies are vulnerable to the impacts of sea level rise. Major cities like
New Orleans, with roughly half of its population below sea level, Miami,
Tampa, Charleston, and Virginia Beach are among those most at risk.
As a result of current sea level rise, the coastline of Puerto Rico around
Rincòn is being eroded at a rate of 3.3 feet per year. Puerto Rico has one of
the highest population densities in the world, with 56% of the population
living in coastal municipalities.116
As the Program is quick to point out, the economic consequences of sea-level rise in the
Southeast could be considerable. As one example, “Louisiana State Highway 1, heavily
used for delivering critical oil and gas resources from Port Fourchon, is sinking, at the
110
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same time sea level is rising, resulting in more frequent and more severe flooding during
high tides and storms. A 90-day shutdown of this road would cost the nation an estimated
$7.8 billion.”117 It does not mention, however, the implications for toxic exposures.
Along the Pacific coast, in California, “Sea level has risen approximately 7 inches
from 1900 to 2005, and is expected to rise at growing rates in this century.”118 “Flooding
and erosion in coastal areas are already occurring even at existing sea levels and damaging
some California coastal areas during storms and extreme high tides. Sea level rise is
projected to increase as Earth continues to warm, resulting in major damage as winddriven waves ride upon higher seas and reach farther inland.”119 In the Pacific Northwest,
“the effects of sea level rise, erosion, inundation, threats to infrastructure and habitat, and
increasing ocean acidity collectively pose a major threat to the region.”120 The damage to
critical coastal infrastructure could be considerable:
The region’s populous coastal cities face rising sea levels, extreme high
tides, and storm surges, which pose particular risks to highways, bridges,
power plants, and sewage treatment plants. Climate-related challenges also
increase risks to critical port cities, which handle half of the nation’s
incoming shipping containers.121
Most of this infrastructure, however, is also associated with coastal toxicity and
hazardous materials.
Thus, even in government reports that acknowledge climate change and describe
its projects impacts on U.S. coastal communities in detail, little attention is paid to the
existing and potential risks from toxics in the coastal zone. Dealing with this toxic load,
however, should be added to climate change adaptation efforts in this country. As part of
that effort, the next Part reviews existing laws particularly relevant to reducing the toxic
load along the nation’s coasts.
III. EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELEVANT TO COASTAL TOXICITY
A.

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA)

117
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As noted, Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to promote the cleanup of existing
toxic sites; in that sense, CERCLA is best characterized as retrospective environmental
law (i.e., providing for cleanup liability after a hazardous release has already occurred)
than proactive or preventive. Nevertheless, CERCLA and its state analogs remain
important legal vehicles for promoting the cleanup of existing toxic sites along the coast.
CERCLA is triggered by the release—past or present—of hazardous substances
from a facility.122 Because CERCLA was one of the last major federal environmental
statutes that Congress enacted, it defines “hazardous substances” by referencing earlier
legislation—toxic pollutants under the Clean Water Act, hazardous wastes under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air
Act, and imminently hazardous chemicals under the Toxic Substance Control Act.123
However, the EPA can also designate additional “hazardous substances” particularly for
CERCLA.124
The EPA also designates “reportable quantities” of hazardous substances.125 In
order to facilitate effective responses to new releases of hazardous substances, CERCLA
requires “[a]ny person in charge of a vessel or an onshore or offshore facility” to
immediately report releases of hazardous substances in excess of the relevant reportable
quantities to the National Response Center as soon as that person knows of the release.126
CERCLA defines “release” broadly to include “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing
into the environment,” except for the many kinds of “releases” that are regulated under
other statutes.127 Thus, pesticide applications regulated under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and pollutant discharges regulated under the
Clean Water Act are exempt from CERCLA’s reporting requirement.128 Otherwise,
failures to report releases of hazardous substances and false reports are subject to criminal
penalties.129
Section 104 of CERCLA authorizes the President of the United States—who has
since delegated this authority to the EPA—to respond to releases of hazardous substances
122

42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2012).
See id. § 9601(14) (defining “hazardous substance” by cross-referencing these
statutes).
124
Id. §§ 9601(14)(B), 9602(a).
125
Id. § 9602(a).
126
Id. § 9603(a).
127
Id. § 9601(22).
128
Id. § 9603(e).
129
Id. § 9603(b).
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through removal and remedial actions.130 Removal actions are the government’s
immediate response to a spill or release, designed primarily to contain the hazardous
substances and limit the threat to the public.131 Remedial actions, in contrast, are “actions
consistent with permanent remedy . . . .”132 Both such cleanup actions must be consistent
with the National Contingency Plan,133 which establishes “procedures and standards for
responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants . . . .”134
Alternatively, the EPA can order abatement actions under section 106 of
CERCLA.135 As a practical matter, the primary difference between a section 104 cleanup
and a section 106 cleanup is that under section 104, governments perform the cleanup
and seek reimbursement, while under section 106, potentially responsible parties (PRPs)
perform (and generally pay for) the cleanup themselves, subject to federal and/or state
supervision.136 The EPA must notify the affected state before ordering a section 106
abatement action137 and “shall promulgate regulations providing for substantial and
meaning involvement by each State in initiation, development, and selection of remedial
actions to be undertaken in that State.”138 The affected state also has a right to concur (or
not) in the federal government’s selection of certain remedial actions and a right to
intervene in or bring a relevant action if the state objects to the remedy that the federal
government chooses.139
Section 107 is the heart of CERCLA’s liability scheme. First, section 107
identifies four categories of PRPs:
(1)

the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,

(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,

130

Id. § 9604(a).
See id. § 9601(23) (defining “remove” and “removal”).
132
Id. § 9601(24).
133
Id. § 9604(a).
134
Id. § 9605(a).
135
Id. § 9606(a).
136
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 161 (2004) (citing Key Tronic
Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994)).
137
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2010).
138
Id. § 9621(f).
139
Id. § 9621(f)(2).
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(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such
person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous
substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substance for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs . . . .140
These PRPs become liable for four kinds of costs and damages:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan [response costs];
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release [natural resources damages]; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study [required
under section 104].141
Finally, Section 107 provides PRPs with only three defenses: (1) if the release and
resulting damages were caused solely by “an act of God”; (2) if the release and resulting
damages were caused solely by “an act of war”; or (3) if the release and resulting damages
were caused solely by “an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent” of the PRP, and with no contractual relationship with the PRP, if the PRP
exercised “due care” and “took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any
such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or

140
141

Id. § 9607(a).
Id.
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omissions . . . .”142 Otherwise, PRPs can pursue a variety of settlement options with the
governments143 and contribution actions against each other.144
CERCLA’s basic goal is thus to have the people or companies who created a
contaminated site pay to clean it up. However, Congress also created a Hazardous
Substance Superfund, funded through a tax on chemical and oil companies, to pay for
the cleanup of “orphan” sites.145 This tax “expired in 1995, and [it has] not been
reinstated,146 with the result that Congress has been appropriating money to the
Superfund through the normal federal budget process.
While CERCLA remains an important legal aspect of promoting coastal cleanups,
contamination removal under its auspices has been notoriously slow in many
circumstances, and nothing in the act requires governments to prioritize sites by location
(say, in the coastal zone). The San Jacinto Waste Pits flooded during Hurricane Harvey
provide an apt example. As noted, the site first became contaminated in the 1960s, and it
has long been known for its toxicity. For example, “the Texas Parks and Wildlife
Department warns people should not eat fish and crabs from the area because the animals
may be contaminated,” and the EPA added the site to the CERCLA NPL in 2008.147 After
Harvey, then-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt put the San Jacinto Waste Pits on a list of
special sites deserving of his personal attention, the EPA announced a $115 million plan
to remove contaminated material from the site, and a court approved an agreement
whereby two companies would come up with a plan to clean up the site.148 However, in
April 2018, Pruitt removed the San Jacinto Waste Pits from his special list, leaving the

142

Id. § 9607(b).
Id. § 9622
144
Id. § 9613(f).
145
Id. § 9611.
146
Id.
147
Rebecca Hersher, “EPA Takes Toxic Site Flooded by Harvey Off Special Cleanup
List,” National Public Radio (NPR), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/04/16/601867839/epa-takes-toxic-site-flooded-by-harvey-off-specialcleanup-list (April 16, 2018).
148
Id. See also Michael D. Regan, “Health concerns swirl in Texas months after floods
from
Harvey
spread
toxic
waste,”
PBS
NewsHour,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/health-concerns-swirl-in-texas-months-afterfloods-from-harvey-spread-toxic-waste (Dec. 10, 2017) (reporting the same figures).
143
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companies with 29 months—more than two years—to formulate their cleanup plan.149
Cleanup at the site, even after Harvey, is expected to take more than four years.150
B.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)

Congress enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA)151 in 1976, but after the
1980 amendments it is much more commonly known the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). Unlike CERCLA, RCRA is proactive, seeking to prevent new
contamination for hazardous waste. Specifically, Congress found that “although land is
too valuable a national resource to be needlessly polluted by discarded materials, most
solid waste is disposed of on land in open dumps and sanitary landfills” and that “disposal
of solid waste and hazardous waste in or on the land without careful planning and
management can present a danger to human health and the environment * * *.”152
RCRA applies to “solid waste,” which the statute defines as:
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material,
including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from
community activities, but does not include solid or dissolved material in
domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows
or industrial sources which are point sources subject to permits under
section 1342 of Title 33 [the Clean Water Act], or source, special nuclear,
or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended * * *.153
From there, RCRA regulation depends on whether solid waste is hazardous or not.

149

Rebecca Hersher, “EPA Takes Toxic Site Flooded by Harvey Off Special Cleanup
List,” National Public Radio (NPR), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/04/16/601867839/epa-takes-toxic-site-flooded-by-harvey-off-specialcleanup-list (April 16, 2018).
150
Michael D. Regan, “Health concerns swirl in Texas months after floods from Harvey
spread toxic waste,” PBS NewsHour, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/healthconcerns-swirl-in-texas-months-after-floods-from-harvey-spread-toxic-waste (Dec. 10,
2017) (reporting the same figures).
151
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012).
152
Id. § 6901(b)(1), (2).
153
Id. § 6903(27).
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Nonhazardous solid waste is subject to RCRA Subtitle D. Under these provisions,
states received the primary authority to regulate non-hazardous solid waste. First, they
were expected to enact state solid waste management plans.154 In order to receive federal
approval, these state plans had to meet six statutory requirements. Most importantly,
states had to forbid new open dumps within their borders and provide for the closing or
upgrading of all existing open dumps.155 As part of these controls, states were expected
to implement permit programs for solid waste management facilities to control their
intake of hazardous waste.156 In addition, new disposal could only occur at sanitary
landfills.157 Under Congress’s requirements, all new, replacement, and expanded landfills
had to be built with at least two liners and leachate collection systems and had to provide
for groundwater monitoring.158
RCRA regulation, however, focuses far more stringently on hazardous waste,
which is regulated under Subtitle C. A “hazardous waste” is “a solid waste, or
combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical,
chemical, or infectious characteristics may—”
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of,
or otherwise managed.159
The EPA had the responsibility to “develop and promulgate criteria for identifying the
characteristics of hazardous waste, and for listing hazardous waste” and to actually list
hazardous wastes subject to RCRA’s subtitle C requirements, “taking into account
toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in tissue, and
other related factors such as flammability, corrosiveness, and other hazardous
characteristics.”160 It identified characteristics that made wastes hazardous—

154

Id. § 6943.
Id. § 6943(a)(2), (3).
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Id. § 6945(c)(1).
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Id. § 6944(b).
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Id. § 6924(o).
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Id. § 6903(5).
160
Id. § 6921(a), (b)(1).
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ignitability,161 corrosiveness,162 reactivity,163 and toxicity164—but also listed specific
types of hazardous wastes from various types of industries and industrial processes.165
Subtitle C seeks to regulate hazardous wastes from “cradle to grave”—that is,
from initial creation to eventual (safe) disposal. Hazardous waste generation is “the act
or process of producing hazardous waste.”166 Hazardous waste generators must keep
records that identifying the hazardous wastes that they generate; label those wastes
properly; store the waste in appropriate containers; begin RCRA’s manifest system to
track the waste; and provide information and reports about the waste.167 Hazardous waste
transporters, in turn, must keep records about the waste they transport, continue the
manifest system, refuse to transport improperly labeled hazardous waste, and deliver the
waste only to permitted treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities.168 RCRA
rigorously regulates these TSD facilities, requiring permitting, financial responsibility,
contingency plans, recordkeeping, and strict compliance with storage, handling, and
disposal requirements.169 In addition, as noted above, TSD facilities become liable for
corrective actions—that is, for cleanups at and beyond the TSD facility if hazardous
wastes escape.170
Several facilities located in and near Houston during Hurricane Harvey were
regulated under Subtitle C. For example, the Arkema Chemical Plant in Crosby, Texas,
that caught fire was regulated as a RCRA large quantity hazardous waste generator under
the Handler ID TXD043750512.171 Until 2011, the plant shipped all of its wastes off-site,
but by 2013 it was generating over 16,000 tons of hazardous waste and handling most of
that waste on-site.172 It produces a variety of hazardous wastes, including toxic metals
(arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, selenium, and silver), toxic benzene, and
toxic tetracholoroethylene, among several others.173 Nevertheless, until Harvey, the
161

40 C.F.R. § 261.21 (2017).
Id. § 261.22.
163
Id. § 261.23.
164
Id. § 261.24.
165
Id. §§ 261.31-261.33.
166
42 U.S.C. § 6903(6) (2012).
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Id. § 6922(a).
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Id. § 6923(a).
169
Id. § 6924(a).
170
Id. § 6924(v).
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Information retrieved from the EPA’s RCRAInfo database on July 31, 2018,
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/enviro/rcrainfoquery_3.facility_information?pgm_sys_id=TXD
043750512.
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Id.
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Id.
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chemical plant was relatively compliant with RCRA: The State of Texas had taken only
two informal (letter-based) enforcement actions under RCRA against the plant, although
the facility has not been inspected since October 2013.174
C.

Coastal Zone Management Act

The federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)175 essentially bribes coastal
states with federal consistency requirements, money, and technical assistance into
engaging in proactive coastal planning and management.176 Specifically, the Act
encourages states to create Coastal Zone Management Programs that meet 16 detailed
requirements,177 most of which are easily classified as land (and sometimes water) use
planning178 or governmental organization, authority, and procedures.179 A few
requirements are fairly specific; for example, coastal states must address energy facilities
in the coastal zone (including their impacts),180 coastal erosion,181 and nonpoint source
pollution.182
The delineated components of a Coastal Zone Management Program are certainly
broad enough to allow a state to prioritize coastal toxicity.183 However, nothing in the
Act explicitly mentions toxics, toxicity, or hazardous waste.
Like all coastal states except Alaska, Texas implements an approved Coastal
Zone Management Program, which it first adopted in 1997.184 The state’s goals for its
program center around Coastal Natural Resource Areas, or CNRAs. Those goals are:
•

To protect, preserve, restore, and enhance the diversity, quality, quantity,
functions, and values of CNRAs;

174

Information retrieved from the EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online
(ECHO) database on July 31, 2018, https://echo.epa.gov/detailed-facilityreport?fid=110000463258.
175
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466 (2012).
176
See id. §§ 1455-1456.
177
Id. § 1455(d).
178
Id. § 1455(d)(2), (9), (11)(B), (12), (13).
179
Id. § 1455(d)(3)-(7), (10), (14)-(16).
180
Id. § 1455(d)(2)(H), (8).
181
Id. § 1455(d)(2)(I).
182
Id. §§ 1455(d)(16), 1455b.
183
E.g., id. § 1456b(a)(2), (4)-(6).
184
TEXAS COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, 2015-2016 BIENNIAL REPORT 1-2 (Dec.
2016),
available
at
http://www.glo.texas.gov/coast/coastalmanagement/forms/files/CMP-Biennial-Report-2015-2016.pdf.
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To ensure sound management of all coastal resources by allowing for compatible
economic development and multiple human uses of the coastal zone;
To minimize loss of human life and property due to the impairment and loss of
protective features of CNRAs;
To ensure and enhance planned public access to and enjoyment of the coastal
zone in a manner that is compatible with private property rights and other uses of
the coastal zone;
To balance the benefits from economic development and multiple human uses of
the coastal zone, the benefits from protecting, preserving, restoring, and
enhancing CNRAs, the benefits from minimizing loss of human life and property,
and the benefits from public access to and enjoyment of the coastal zone;
To coordinate agency and subdivision decision-making affecting CNRAs by
establishing clear, objective policies for the management of CNRAs;
To make agency and subdivision decision-making affecting CNRAs efficient by
identifying and addressing duplication and conflicts among local, state, and
federal regulatory and other programs for the management of CNRAs;
To make agency and subdivision decision-making affecting CNRAs more
effective by employing the most comprehensive, accurate, and reliable
information and scientific data available and by developing, distributing for
public comment, and maintaining a coordinated, publicly accessible geographic
information system (GIS) of maps of the coastal zone and CNRAs at the earliest
possible date;
To make coastal management processes visible, coherent, accessible, and
accountable to the people of Texas by providing for public participation in the
ongoing development and implementation of the CMP; and
To educate the public about the principal coastal problems of state concern and
technology available for the protection and improved management of CNRAs.185

In addition, however, Texas is pursuing a coastal resiliency program, with public
meetings focused on “increasing economic and environmental vulnerabilities, resulting
from population growth, increased storm intensity, and shoreline erosion” and on
“planning for changing conditions and future storm hazards along the coast.”186 In
addition, the Program “is developing the Master Plan, a long-term framework intended
to mitigate damage from future coastal natural disasters and preserve and enhance the
state’s coastal natural resources and assets.”187 Nevertheless, although coastal
infrastructure is clearly part of these discussions and resiliency planning, none of the
identified strategies—“ 1) restoring Texas’s beaches and dunes; 2) bay shoreline
stabilization and estuarine wetland restoration (living shorelines); 3) stabilizing the
185

Id. at 3.
Id. at 10.
187
Id.
186
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GIWW; 4) freshwater wetland and coastal uplands conservation; 5) delta and lagoon
restoration; 6) oyster reef creation and restoration; 7) rookery island creation and
restoration; and 8) plans, policies, and programs”188—acknowledge coastal toxicity as a
possible problem.
Toxicity consciousness may emerge in some parts of Texas at a more local level.
For example, using grants from the Coastal Zone Management Program, Galveston Bay
engaged both in a contaminated seafood warning program to educate subsistence and
recreational fishers, especially in low-income and Spanish-speaking immigrant
communities, “about the risk of consuming seafood contaminated with toxic substances”
and a program to educate boaters about their wastes—most recently, the illegality of
sewage discharges but with additional issues slated for future years.189 These
developments thus suggest that Galveston might be one of the Texas coastal
municipalities that most open to dealing more proactively with coastal toxicity problems.
D.

State and Local Land Use Planning

Unlike environmental and natural resource regulation, land use planning is
usually the particular province of municipalities, and this aspect of local law can be
critical to dealing with climate change and its impacts. C40, “a network of the world’s
megacities committed to addressing climate change,”190 has underscored the importance
of land use planning as follows:
Land use planning provides the strategic framework for the growth of a city,
determining the physical uses of space that will influence how people live
and move, for generations to come. Cities have significant authority over
land use policies and regulations. . . . It is particularly important that cities
have a good plan for how they will address growth, because as C40 research
has shown, the planning decisions made today will have a major impact on
the carbon emissions of tomorrow.191
By this organization’s international count, “79% of cities have the power to set land use
policies and regulations and 81% are responsible for carrying out the function of land use
planning.”192

188

Id.
Id. at 16, 18, 22, 26.
190
C40 Cities, About C40, https://www.c40.org/about (as viewed July 31, 2018).
191
C40
Cities,
Land
Use
Planning:
Network
Overview,
https://www.c40.org/networks/land-use-planning (as viewed July 31, 2018).
192
Id.
189
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Land use planning is also relevant to latent and cumulative toxicity concerns.
Indeed, “[l]and use data are increasingly understood as important indicators of potential
environmental health risk in urban areas where micro-scale or neighborhood level hazard
exposure data are not routinely collected.”193 In 2003, a National Academy of Public
Administration panel reported to the EPA that municipalities could use land use more
effectively to reduce residents’ cumulative toxic exposures. Most directly, “local
planning and zoning authorities could be used to reduce adverse impacts where industrial
and residential areas are located near each other.”194 Notably, however, the report also
advocated greater coordination and interaction between states and local governments to
best deploy land use planning tools. For example, it recommended that states take steps
to ensure local government participation in environmental permitting decisions (such as
RCRA permitting decisions made through delegated federal authority), because
“[t]hrough active involvement, local governments can help ensure that proposed
environmental permits contain the conditions necessary to protect public health and the
environment at the community level.”195 The report saw great promise for such increased
cooperation, concluding that “[i]f state and local officials make creative and aggressive
use of existing legal authorities, it may be possible to resolve the environmental and
public health concerns of community residents.”196
Houston is infamous, however, for its lack of land use planning: “The city of
Houston proper is unique among large US cities in that it has no traditional use-based
zoning (ala-Sim City: residential here, commercial there, etc.) . . . .”197 However, that
193

Jason Corburn, Urban land use, air toxics and public health: Assessing hazardous
exposures at the neighborhood scale, 27:2 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 145, 145
(March
2007),
available
at
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0195925506001260.
194
PHILIP RUTLEDGE, A. JAMES BARNES, TEODORO BENAVIDES, JONATHAN HOWES,
DAVID MORA, JAMES MURLEY, & SYLVESTER MURRAY, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, ADDRESSING COMMUNITY CONCERNS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
RELATES TO LAND USE PLANNING AND ZONING 18 (July 2003), available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/napa-land-use-zoning63003.pdf.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 19.
197
Daniel Herriges, “Houston Isn’t Flooded Because of Its Land Use Planning,” Strong
Towns, https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2017/8/30/houston-hurricane-harvey-landuse (Aug. 30, 2017). See also Nolan Gray, “How Houston Regulates Land Use,” Market
Urbanism,
https://marketurbanism.com/2016/09/19/how-houston-regulates-land-use/
(Sept. 19, 2016) (“Unlike every other major U.S. city, Houston doesn’t mandate the
separation of residential, commercial, and industrial developments. This means that
restaurants, homes, warehouses, and offices are free to mix as the market allows. As many
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doesn’t mean that development is completely haphazard. The city itself “regulates land
use in many other ways, such as minimum-parking requirements. Many neighborhoods
have homeowners associations and deed restrictions that limit what can be built. And
Houston’s suburbs largely do have zoning.”198
Notably, in the immediate wake of Harvey, both local and national pundits
debated the contribution of Houston’s land use planning to the severity of the flooding,
particularly in terms of wetlands destruction and building in floodplains.199 Less
flamboyant were several pre-Harvey examinations of the relationship be Houston area’s
land use planning and residents’ potential toxic exposure. For example, Houston passed
a hazardous materials ordinance in 1996 that prevents hazardous facilities from locating
in neighborhoods that are more than one-third residential.200 However, like most such
laws, this ordinance did not apply to hazardous facilities already in existence, effectively
allowing those existing facilities to continue.201
A team of economists from the University of Pittsburgh and University of
Washington, Bothell, happened to be assessing the long-term effect of zoning in Chicago
across Hurricane Harvey’s timeframe, drafting their results in 2016 but publishing in
May 2018.202 Because of Houston’s resistance to traditional zoning, it served as the
have pointed out, however, market-driven separation of incompatible uses—think strip
clubs and preschools—is common in Houston.”).
198
Herriges, supra note 197.
199
Compare id.; Emily Hamilton, “What Houston’s Critics Get Wrong: land use
regulations weren’t to blame for Hurricane Harvey’s destruction,” U.S. News & World
Report,
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2017-0918/land-use-wasnt-to-blame-for-houstons-hurricane-harvey-destruction (Sept. 18, 2017),
with Ana Campoy & David Yanofsky, “Houston’s flooding shows what happens when
you
ignore
science
and
let
developers
run
rampant,”
Quartz,
https://qz.com/1064364/hurricane-harvey-houstons-flooding-made-worse-byunchecked-urban-development-and-wetland-destruction/ (Aug. 29, 2017); Shawn
Boburg & Beth Reinhard, “Houston’s ‘Wild West’ growth: How the city’s development
may have contributed to devastating flooding,” The Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/harvey-urbanplanning/?utm_term=.658f694b5b1a (Aug. 29, 2017).
200
Lydia DePillis, “How zoning impacts your proximity to pollution: Sixty-five percent
of Houston is within a mile of a toxic emitter,” The Houston Chronicle,
https://www.chron.com/business/texanomics/article/How-zoning-impacts-yourproximity-to-pollution-9232526.php (Sept. 20, 2016).
201
Id.
202
Allison Shertzer, Tate Twinam, & Randall P. Walsh, Zoning and the economic
geography of cities, 105 J. URBAN ECON. 20, 20 (May 2018).
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researchers’ control/counterfactual.203 Provocatively, 65 percent of Houston lies within
one mile of a TRI reporting facility, compared to 30 percent of Austin, 44 percent of
Dallas, and 43 percent of San Antonio, “suggest[ing] that land use patterns in relatively
un-regulated Houston differ measurably from comparable cities that experienced formal
zoning.”204 In addition, the researchers’ results for Chicago “strongly suggest that over
the long-run urban planning has been eﬀective in creating residential neighborhoods that
are distant from undesirable manufacturing uses, and that houses in these neighborhoods
are more valuable as a result,”205 a result the economists clearly view as desirable.
However, it should be noted that there is another way of looking at the
researchers’ results, which is that Houston’s approach to land use has more fairly spread
the city’s overall toxic burden across its citizens. Notably, the researchers found that
areas zoned for manufacturing or commercial use in Chicago were statistically more like
to contain TRI reporting facilities206—a result that makes inherent intuitive sense. Such
concentration of toxics-emitting facilities, however, is also a primary source of
environmental justice concerns, as those who cannot afford the more expensive
neighborhoods are forced by economics to live with additional toxic exposure and risk.
Regardless of how land use planning distributes toxic exposures, however, such
exposures remain public health risks. For better for all concerned to reduce the city’s
overall toxic burden in the first place. Houston’s 1996 hazardous facility ordinance was
more akin to Chicago’s separation-of-uses approach to land use planning that to a real
effort to reduce overall toxicity, but Part IV will discuss alternative approaches that better
implement a toxicity reduction goal.
E.

Tort Law

Tort is the traditional remedy for preventable damage, and four torts in particular
are generally associated with releases of toxic materials. Strict liability arises when a
defendant engages in inherently dangerous activities or abnormally dangerous
conduct.207 Unlike strict liability, negligence is a fault-based approach to liability that
requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant violated a duty or standard of care,
factually and legally causing the plaintiff harm.208 Trespass applies to a defendant’s
physical invasion of the plaintiff’s real property, such as a physical spilling of toxic
203

Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
205
Id. at 34.
206
Id. at 28.
207
ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND MATERIALS 32
(3rd Ed. 2012).
208
Id. at 32-33.
204

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224768

Craig

OUR TOXIC COASTS

35

materials onto the plaintiff’s property.209 Finally, nuisance allows a plaintiff to recover
when a defendant unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of real
property.210 “Public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with rights held by the
public in general,” while private nuisance “is an unreasonable interference with the rights
of a plaintiff who has a possessory interest in the land affected.”211 Like CERCLA,
however, tort liability is retrospective and reactive: the damage, in almost all cases, has
already occurred.
Hurricane Harvey gave rise to several follow-on lawsuits, many demonstrating
how injured plaintiffs can attempt to use tort liability to seek compensation for their
exposures to coastal toxicity. The Arkema Chemical Plant in Crosby has become a
particularly cogent defendant as a result of the fires and other toxic releases at the plant.
In early September 2017, even as Harvey was still winding down, “[s]even police, fire
and emergency medical technicians sued Arkema in Harris County District Court for at
least $1 million, alleging negligence by the company and executives led flammable
organic peroxides stored at the site to ignite after the plant lost power during the
storm.”212 Their complaint, filed in the Harris County District Court,213 alleges that the
plaintiffs suffered vomiting and loss of breath while responding to the Arkema fires and
asserts causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, and negligence per se.214
The next month, residents of Crosby, Texas, filed a class action lawsuit in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, against
Arkema,215 alleging negligence, trespass, nuisance, property damage, personal injury,
failure to warn, product liability, ultra-hazardous activity (strict liability), gross
negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.216 They seek punitive damages
and are asking the court to pierce Arkema’s corporate veil so that its parent corporations
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may also be held liable.217 The plaintiffs base their complaints both on the fires at the
plant and on releases from two water tanks. They allege that “an estimated 23,608 pounds
of contaminants were released from two [water] tanks including: ethylbenzene,mineral
spirits, naptha, naphthalene, organic peroxides, trimethylbenzene, tert-butyl alcohol, 2,5
dimethyl-2,5 di(t-butylperoxy)hexane and t-amyl alcohol.”218 In addition, according to
the plaintiffs, the smoke and ash from the fire released PAHs, toxic metals like antimony,
volatile organic compounds like acetone, dioxins, furans, and a host of other toxic
compounds.219
What is striking in both cases is not just the plaintiffs’ assertions of past injuries
during the hurricane and its toxic releases, but their fears for unknown future injuries.
Thus, the plaintiff first responders seek not only actual damages for pain already suffered
and medical care already received, but also “[r]easonable and necessary medical care and
expenses which will in all reasonable probability be incurred in the future;” “[p]hysical
pain and suffering in the future;” “[p]hysical impairment which, in all reasonable
probability, will be suffered in the future;” “[l]oss of earning capacity which will, in all
probability, be incurred in the future;” “[d]isfigurement in the future;” “[m]ental anguish
in the future;” and “[t]he cost of future medical monitoring.”220 The Crosby residents,
similarly, seek “[a]n Order establishing a Medical Monitoring Program designed to
survey as appropriate and to protect the Class Members from latent, dread disease, funded
by the Defendants . . . .”221 These cases, therefore, frame the Arkema flooding, fire, and
releases as the source of true toxic torts, plunging the plaintiffs legally into the uncertain
world of “futures” cases.222

217

Id. at 29-31.
Id. at 16 ¶ 46.
219
Id. at 16-19.
220
Graves v. Arkema Complaint, supra note 213, at 13.
221
Wheeler v. Arkema Complaint, supra note 215, at 32.
222
One of the classic problems of toxic torts is the sometimes very long latency period
between exposure to a toxic agent and manifestation of a disease. “Because of these
issues, plaintiffs have increasingly sought recovery after exposure but before the
manifestation of disease has taken place. These ‘futures’ cases are among the most hotly
debated in toxic tort law.” ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, MICHAEL D. GREEN, ANDREW R. KLEIN
& JOSEPH SANDERS, TOXIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 668
(Thompson Reuters 2011). Medical monitoring is the least controversial of the three
typical futures remedies, which also include fear of disease and enhanced risk of disease.
Id. at 668-711.
218

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224768

Craig

OUR TOXIC COASTS

37

Studies released in May 2018 suggest that the plaintiffs in these cases may have
good grounds for their lawsuits.223 The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board found that officials at the Arkema chemical plant had been warned over one year
before Harvey that that plant was at risk of flooding, and it concluded in its 154-page
report that Arkema “was not prepared for the 6 feet of water that wiped out the facility’s
power and backup generators.”224 However, as the claims for medical monitoring and
future damages show, the latent toxicity around Houston has morphed, because of
Hurricane Harvey, into psychologically real and legally cognizable worries for all of the
Arkema-exposed plaintiffs about their future health, with the true future risks that they
face from their exposures during Harvey very unclear.
IV. THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING A PRECAUTIONARY, HUMAN HEALTHBASED APPROACH TO IMPROVING COASTAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN THE
ANTHROPOCENE
It can almost always be said, in almost any context, that governments could
improve both their enforcement of environmental and public health laws and their
disaster preparedness and response. Analyses of Hurricane Harvey in Houston certainly
support these common suggestions for improving coastal responses to hurricanes.225
Nevertheless, environmental enforcement and disaster response are largely reactionary,
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rather than precautionary, responses to toxic coasts, effectively focused less on protecting
public health than on supporting coastal industry until such industry causes real
problems.
Coastal states and municipalities can pursue more precautionary, health-based
management policies regarding toxics in the coastal zone. Federal law almost always
leaves states free to pursue more stringent pollution policies than it requires, and new
technologies can help these governments to de-toxify their coastal zones. This Part
presents three truly precautionary suggestions that serve to promote coastal public health
by reducing the ability of coastal storms and sea-level rise to produce toxic hazards
during flooding and inundation.
A.

Clean Up Existing Contaminated Sites

While, as Part III discussed, legal authorities exist at both the federal and state
levels to clean up existing toxic waste dumps and other hazardous sites, such cleanups
have not proceeded as fast as they might, nor has coastal contamination been made a
priority. As a result, “[c]ontaminated sites often go for years and sometimes decades
without being fully cleaned up.”226
Finding sufficient money for these often-expensive cleanups is often part of the
problem. As noted, the Superfund tax expired in 1995, and Congress has been funding
CERCLA cleanups through annual appropriations. In 2015, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) found that both the funding and the effectiveness of
CERCLA were declining, sometimes dramatically.227 Its more specific findings are
worth quoting at length:
Annual federal appropriations to the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) Superfund program generally declined from about $2 billion to about
$1.1 billion in constant 2013 dollars from fiscal years 1999 through 2013.
EPA expenditures—from these federal appropriations—of site-specific
cleanup funds on remedial cleanup activities at nonfederal National
Priorities List (NPL) sites declined from about $0.7 billion to about $0.4
billion during the same time period. . . . EPA spent the largest amount of
cleanup funds in Region 2 [comprising New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico,
226
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the U.S. Virgin Islands, and eight tribal nations228], which accounted for
about 32 percent of cleanup funds spent at nonfederal NPL sites during this
15-year period. The majority of cleanup funds was spent in seven states,
with the most funds spent in New Jersey—over $2.0 billion in constant 2013
dollars, or more than 25 percent of cleanup funds.
From fiscal years 1999 through 2013, the total number of nonfederal sites
on the NPL annually remained relatively constant, while the number of
remedial action project completions and construction completions generally
declined. . . . The total number of nonfederal sites on the NPL increased
from 1,054 in fiscal year 1999 to 1,158 in fiscal year 2013, and averaged
about 1,100 annually. The number of remedial action project completions
at nonfederal NPL sites generally declined by about 37 percent during the
15-year period. Similarly, the number of construction completions at
nonfederal NPL sites generally declined by about 84 percent during the
same period.229
Perhaps surprisingly to many, despite President Trump’s February 2018 overall
proposal to slash the EPA’s budget, he proposed to maintain CERCLA cleanup funding
at $1.1 billion for fiscal year 2019 and has proposed other mechanisms for funding
cleanups as part of his infrastructure package.230 Some of these proposals, like giving
CERCLA cleanups “access to financing under the Water Infrastructure Finance and
Innovation Act (WIFIA) lending program to address contamination to water resources,”
might simply shift existing money from other environmental issues to cleanups, both
others would expand the grant money available to cleanup both brownfields and NPL
sites.231
In March 2018, Congress did appropriate almost $1.1 billion to the Superfund,
although that money can also be transferred to other federal agencies.232 It also directly
provided $80 million in state and tribal assistance grants under CERCLA,233 over $77
million to the National Institutes of Health for CERCLA-required health studies,234 and
228
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over $74 million to the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry for health risk
assessments under CERCLA.235 In addition, under the heading of “Infrastructure,”
Congress added another $63 million for the EPA’s CERCLA activities, $650 million for
the state and tribal grants program, and $53 million to the EPA’s Water Infrastructure
Finance and Innovation Program Account for loans.236 Finally, Congress also enacted
through the budget bill the Brownfields Utilization, Investment, and Local Development
(BUILD) Act of 2018, which, inter alia, increases the availability of grants and loans for
brownfield sites—but not those on the NPL.237
However, this is not enough money. Thus, there continue to be calls to reinstate
the Superfund tax,238 and there are also calls to increase the EPA’s CERCLA enforcement
financing, providing the agency the ability to force the liable parties to pay for
cleanups.239
Direct citizen actions offer an alternative approach. The ultimate “fix” to coastal
cleanups is altered public priorities that can put sufficient pressure on politicians at all
levels of government to provide the funding and personnel necessary to expedite detoxifying actions. In the meantime, citizen lawsuits can sometimes provide a second-best
jump-start. Unlike most federal environmental laws, however, CERCLA’s citizen suit
provision240 is of limited use to plaintiffs who are not themselves liable under the Act to
try to force actual cleanups, because many of the damages that plaintiffs would seek are
not “response costs” recoverable under CERCLA,241 because individuals, NGOs, and
cities cannot seek natural resources damages,242 and because CERCLA includes a fairly
stringent bar to any citizen suit that challenges an ongoing cleanup, including suits
235
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seeking to strengthen that effort.243 RCRA’s citizen suit provision, however, can often
(but not always) fill in, because it allows plaintiffs to bring suit “against any person who
has contributed or is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment . . . .”244 While
litigation also requires money, RCRA allows courts to award costs and attorney fees to
successful plaintiffs,245 and, like most federal environmental citizen suit provisions, it
preserves plaintiffs’ tort remedies.246
However, cities can also act to effectuate coastal cleanups. As one example, the
City of Emeryville, California, located between Berkeley and Oakland on San Francisco
Bay, was essentially one large brownfield site.247 Specifically, “As large industries began
to contract and relocate to other cities in the 1970s, they left behind properties with toxins
that had to be cleaned up before other businesses could use them.”248 To address these
sites, the City assembled state and federal grants both to clean up properties that it owns
and to make loans to private property owners for private remediation.249 One of the city’s
current projects will become a greenway; another will be turned into affordable
housing.250
B.

Implement Toxic-Aware Land Use and Waste Management Planning Along
the Coast

While cleaning up legacy toxicity remains a significant political challenge,
coastal municipalities and states can take a number of other measures to reduce the toxic
load on the nation’s coasts moving forward. One avenue is to revamp land use planning
to more directly address toxicity issues. The National Academy of Public Administration
panel, for example, made several recommendations relevant to municipalities seeking to
avoid concentrations of toxic and hazardous facilities in particular areas. First, such
municipalities should “take steps to eliminate existing nonconforming uses that present
public health and environmental hazards.”251 Second, they should adopt more flexible
zoning techniques, such as:”
243
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• Setting up conditional uses that impose restrictions on certain uses that
may affect environmental justice issues;
• Establishing overlay zones that impose additional requirements to provide
for additional environmental protections;
• Using performance zoning to regulate the adverse impacts of nuisancelike activities, such as noise and odor; and
• Establishing buffer zones in transitional areas between incompatible land
uses, especially for industrial uses adjacent to residential areas.252
Overall, the panel concluded, “[l]ocal governments can play a primary role in identifying
neighborhoods where residents face multiple environmental and public health risks.
However, they need help from the other levels of government to develop and implement
strategies for reducing risks, taking advantage of each level’s unique authorities and
expertise.”253
The Toxics Action Center has also recommended toxicity-reducing actions that
states and municipalities can take. First, states and municipalities can act to reduce or
eliminate persistent toxic chemicals in the coastal zone.254 Persistent toxic chemicals are
slow to break down and lose their toxicity, and “[t]hese contaminants can cause cancer,
birth defects and other reproductive problems, immune system challenges and damage to
the nervous and respiratory systems.”255 Massachusetts, for example, “passed the Toxics
Use Reduction Act (TURA), creating a highly successful system to assist industrial users
of large quantities of toxic chemicals to reduce their toxics use. This program has been
good for public health and also resulted in significant cost savings for many participating
businesses.”256 Indeed, reports indicate that between 1990 and 1999, businesses in
Massachusetts reduced their chemical wastes by 57 percent, reduced their use of toxic
chemicals by 40 percent, reduced their chemical emissions by 80 percent—and save $15
million in the process.257 Other examples of such state statutes exist, including Oregon’s
1989 Toxics Use and Hazardous Waste Reduction Act,258 which requires any large toxics

252

Id.
Id. at 21.
254
Toxics Action Coalition, supra note 29, at 5.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Oregon Center for Environmental Health, Oregon Toxics, & Multnomah County
Sustainability Program, Sustainability Through Toxics Reduction in Local Government
12, http://www.orcities.org/Portals/17/a-z/toxicsreductionpp.pdf (Sept. 2007).
258
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 465.003-465.037 (2017).
253

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224768

Craig

OUR TOXIC COASTS

43

user in the state to complete a toxics use reduction and hazardous waste reduction plan
that identifies alternatives to its current practices.259
Second, relatedly, states and municipalities can work to reduce specific uses of
toxic materials, and hence residents’ direct exposures. For example, in 2001
Massachusetts enacted the Children and Families Protection Act260 “to reduce children’s
exposure to harmful pesticides by restricting pesticide use in private and public schools
and daycare centers and increasing right-to-know. Unfortunately, the law has been
implemented unevenly across the state.”261
Third, coastal municipalities can work to reduce their overall waste streams,
working toward a goal of zero waste. For example, Nantucket, Massachusetts, “diverts
more than 92% of waste from landfills through aggressive recycling and waste reduction
practices and has extended the life of the landfill for decades.”262
C.

Enact Building Codes that Minimize the Potential for Further Toxic
Releases

Many industrial facilities in Houston essentially threw up their hands in trying to
prevent releases during Hurricane Harvey. The on-site manager of Gulf Coast Energy,
for example, declared his facility’s release of methanol “‘impossible to contain’” in light
of the 20-foot floodwaters.263 Similarly, Arkema Chemicals resists arguments that it
failed to prepare its Crosby, Texas, chemical plant adequately, emphasizing that the
flooding during Harvey was “unprecedented.”264
While lawyers, politicians, scientists, economists, and public health officials can
(and do) debate how much preparation is “too much” in light of increasing risks to coastal
communities from climate change, coastal storms, sea-level rise, and storm surge, it is
worth noting that architects and building engineers having been putting considerable
effort into designing “storm-proof” homes and businesses that could greatly reduce toxic
259
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contamination from flooding. These efforts range from developing better building
materials, such as bendable glass and ultra-high performance concrete,265 to architectural
designs intended to deflect wave and wind energy rather than merely withstand them.266
Some of these are futuristic and rounded; others—like many of those designed for Brad
Pitt’s Make It Right Foundation to benefit victims of Hurricane Katrina—simply modify
traditional building shapes and incorporate better materials.267
How exactly buildings are constructed is often dictated by building codes. Indeed,
as one commentator noted, building codes have already been important in reducing
hurricane destruction:
Building codes are the baseline defense against hurricane damage.
Improved building codes in Florida (the most stringent in the nation) after
1992’s Hurricane Andrew required installing impact windows, using
stronger ties between roofs and walls, and securing roof shingles with nails
instead of staples, according to the Wall Street Journal. And indeed, newer
buildings built to code fared better during Hurricane Irma.268
Coastal states and municipalities should consider the new hurricane-proof designs when
updating coastal building codes.
V. CONCLUSION
Public health considerations are an important part of climate change adaptation
strategies. As the U.S. Global Change Research Program recognized in 2014, “Public
health actions, especially preparedness and prevention, can do much to protect people
from some of the impacts of climate change. Early action provides the largest health
benefits. As threats increase, our ability to adapt to future changes may be limited.”269
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Coastal adaptation is a complex subject, but discussions about retreat, armoring,
and coastal water supplies often ignore or sideline the ever-present issue of coastal
toxicity. Coastal storms like Hurricane Harvey, however, make this toxic potential
obvious, underscoring its status as both a continuing present threat to public health and a
future burden on changing coastlines, migrating coastal communities, and evolving
coastal ecosystems. Therefore, a precautionary and health-based approach to coastal
climate change adaptation—at all of the federal, state, and local levels—should explicitly
and directly address the reduction of coastal toxicity, better employing environmental
law, land use planning, toxicity prevention statutes and ordinances, and even building
codes to achieve this goal.
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